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Executive Summary

The December 14, 2012 shooting in Newtown, Connecticut provided a startling and tragic reminder that our schools are not immune from the violence of the real world. This event prompted Superintendent McGinley to call for the formation of the School Safety Task Force ("SSTF"). The SSTF is comprised of teachers, administrators, and parents drawn from our community. Its members include experts in law enforcement, psychology and other disciplines.

The main objectives of the SSTF were two-fold: (1) to evaluate existing security practices, procedures and policies; (2) to make recommendations in order to enhance and improve upon those existing security practices, procedures and policies. The SSTF found that, in large part, our school district currently has appropriate and laudable safeguards in place which anticipate and guard against significant threats to our educational community. However, with the seemingly escalating threats to what we historically considered the safe "bubble" of our schools, the SSTF reviewed certain possible scenarios and attendant recommendations. Specifically, the SSTF considered the following three scenarios: (1) Elementary Student Abduction; (2) Active Shooter/Enraged Intruder; and (3) Aggressive Student Behavior.

Regarding the scenario of Elementary School Abduction, the SSTF recommended the following:

1. Installing fencing or additional fencing around recess areas
2. Engaging visitors in dialogue prior to gaining access
3. Improving facilities for better security
4. Teaching children and adults not to open doors for persons trying to enter a building
5. Improving visitor ID badge procedures
6. Increasing and improving building entrance cameras

Regarding the Active Shooter/Enraged Intruder scenario, the SSTF recommended the following:

1. Increasing number and complexity of active shooter lockdown drills
2. |
3. Ensuring all doors have thumb-locks
4. |
5. Training staff to better react to and evaluate crises situations

And regarding Aggressive Student Behavior, the SSTF recommended the following:

1. Monitoring bullying, cyber bullying and safety concerns through physical and electronic anonymous reporting systems
2. Teaching students to alert employees about possible aggressive student behavior
3. Providing more mental health support and support groups for students
4. Providing call forwarding and points of contact for situations concerning student behavior

The work of the SSTF is ongoing. Safety and security for our students, teachers and community is an ongoing process. As society changes, we will adapt with the essential goal of providing a safe and secure environment in which to teach, to learn and to grow.

Section 1: Introduction

Purpose

The purpose of this report is to present recommendations regarding school security developed by the School Safety Task Force to the Lower Merion Board of School Directors. This document is not the final word in this process; rather, the appendices to this report will be used as a tool to continue examining the recommendations of the Task Force, as well as a tool for the implementation of those recommendations.

Background

On December 14, 2012, a lone gunman broke into the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown Connecticut, and brutally killed twenty school children along with six teachers and administrators. This horrific event not only shocked our nation, but also prompted an immediate evaluation of school safety procedures by school districts around the country. On December 17, 2012, Dr. McGinley, Superintendent, announced the formation of the School Safety Task Force as a result of this tragedy. The Task Force was comprised of Lower Merion School District employees, parents and guardians, community members and public officials, such as the Lower Merion Police and Fire Departments.

The objectives of the SSTF were both immediate and long range:

- Host a public meeting in mid-January for parents/guardians and community members to provide feedback, questions, and concerns regarding school security.
- Examine immediate security concerns and engage in long-term planning around security practices, procedures and policies.
- Review current safety and security practices, policies and procedures.
- Review best security practices from other schools, districts and public and private institutions.
- Develop a process to solicit ongoing public feedback on these issues.
- Compile recommendations and present them to District administration and the Board of School Directors by the May 20, 2013 regular board meeting.

An invitation was extended to parents, guardians, staff and community members on December 18, 2012 to apply for the SSTF. Persons interested in joining the Task Force were asked to provide a letter of interest and resume. Administrators appointed to the SSTF met to review the applications in order to select volunteers with experience and skillsets beneficial to the goals of the committee, while at the same time identifying members that represented all levels of schools: elementary, middle and high school. Invitations to persons selected for the Task Force were sent to individuals on January 11, 2013.

The members of the SSTF met eight times in the evening on the following dates:

Meeting Date	Topic
January 17, 2013	Public Meeting
January 23, 2013	Introduction to the School Safety Task Force
February 20, 2013	Security Policy and Physical Security
February 27, 2013	Security Policy and Physical Security
March 13, 2013	Student Programs and Policies
March 21, 2013	Student Programs and Policies
April 3, 2013	Report Composition
April 17, 2013	Report Review

The need for a comprehensive evaluation of school safety was underscored just days prior to the first meeting of the SSTF. On January 14, 2013, a five year old female student was abducted from the William C. Bryant Elementary School in Philadelphia by a stranger claiming to be a family member of the student. Fortunately, the little girl was found the next day; however, this event would bring to light the need to examine other school security issues beyond the concerns prompted from the active shooter incident.

During the first SSTF meeting, the parents, community members and school personal were polled regarding their school safety and security concerns. The poll was divided by elementary, middle and high school levels. The results are shown in Figures 1-3 below.




Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3

The results of the poll during the first public meeting reflect the public's concern regarding the abduction of elementary children. Although this result was most likely influenced by the abduction of the child in Philadelphia three days prior to the collection of this data, the same concerns were echoed by elementary school principals prior to the abduction of the child. The data collected reflects a concern for physical security and security policy at the elementary level, changing to student programs at the middle school level, and then a mixture of concerns regarding physical security, security policy, and

student programs at the high school level. This data was used throughout the SSTF process and is reflected in the recommendations to the Board of School Directors.

Finally, at the conclusion of the first meeting, members of the Task Force were asked to read the book *Columbine* by Dave Cullen. This book offers insight into how the April 20, 1999 Columbine tragedy happened, how the media handled the situation, and how mistakes were made by the school district, police, and emergency response personnel. The purpose of asking the members of the SSTF to read the book was to develop a foundational knowledge in all members of the SSTF regarding the circumstances leading up to, during and after a horrific event like a school shooting. This reading assignment was beneficial for the entire group. With a common background supplied by the examination of the Columbine shooting, the data collected during the first public meeting and the in-depth knowledge brought to the Task Force by its members, the SSTF began the process of developing recommended mitigations for improved school security.

Risk Assessment Process

The massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary, the abduction from William C. Bryant Elementary School and the reading of *Columbine* would influence the concerns and opinions of participants in the gathering of information and recommendations related to school safety and security.

In an effort to generate a report that objectively examined school security, a risk assessment process was developed based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, SP 800-30 rev. 1, September 2012. The purpose of using the risk assessment process was to examine school security threats and the impact of mitigations objectively in an effort to provide a report to the Board that illustrated a cost-benefit analysis.

A risk assessment process is used to identify, prioritize and determine the best course of action for potential threats to an organization's operations. In the case of a school district, creating a safe climate for the education of children is paramount to its successful operation. Parents, guardians, community members and employees of the District provided hundreds of concerns and recommendations regarding school security. The risk assessment process was adopted by the School Safety Task Force in order to help catalogue, organize and examine these concerns and recommendations. The recommendations provided were often in the form of a mitigation. Mitigation is a method for reducing a risk, not necessarily removing it. Section two of this report summarizes the priority mitigations of the SSTF.

A qualitative approach in accordance with NIST SP 800-30 rev. 1 was adopted for the development of the risk assessment. The source document for the risk assessment clearly states that changing the process to meet the needs of the organization is welcomed as there are no specific requirements regarding the conduct of a risk assessment, so that the various needs of the organization can be addressed. The risk assessment was customized to take into account the needs of the goals of the SSTF, particularly regarding the impact of suggested mitigations. For example, preventing students from being abducted from outside of school during recess is easily accomplished if all outdoor activities are not permitted. However, preventing elementary school children from playing outside during recess is not conducive to a welcoming, healthy school climate.

The recommendations section of this report references the likelihood of threats, impact of threats, and impact of mitigations. The scale of likelihood and impact of threat is the following: Very Low, Low, Moderate, High and Very High. The scale of impact of mitigation is the following: Very Negative, Negative, Neutral, Positive and Very Positive. The selection of this scale is in accordance with NIST SP 800-30 rev 1 qualitative risk assessment. The impact of mitigation includes school climate, trust, staff time loss, instructional time loss, and personal consequences. School climate refers to a safe and productive educational environment and trust refers to the increase or decrease of trust engendered in parents, guardians, students and employees as a result of the mitigation. Staff time loss refers to the amount of time staff will lose due to the implementation or continued execution of a mitigation, while instructional time loss refers to all student (non-victim) instructional time lost. Finally, personal consequence reflects the direct impact on safety, health and well-being of students, family or staff to include, but not limited to arrest, injury, suspension, expulsion, mental health, and loss of privacy.

One of the challenges of the Task Force was consolidating the feedback received by the District and the committee. Over 350 individual recommendations were received via email, phone calls, public meetings, SSTF meetings, training events and other sources of input focused on school safety and security. The feedback was consolidated into 102 different mitigations. These mitigations were examined by the SSTF, and then ranked according to the Task Force's recommendations, and then again by priority items that need to be examined first. For example, of the 52 consolidated mitigations focused on elementary student abduction, 41 were recommended by the Task Force members to pursue, and of the 41 recommendations, 13 were seen as priority mitigations.

The work of selecting recommendations and then priority recommendations was conducted by members of the Task Force working in four groups. In order for a mitigation to appear in the recommendations section of this document, the mitigation had to be selected as a recommendation by all four groups and seen as a priority by at least one group. For example, the second mitigation appearing in the Elementary Student Abduction section of the recommendations below, "Engaging visitors in dialogue," was seen as a recommendation by all four groups, as well as a priority by all four groups, while the "Improving visitor badge procedures" was seen as a recommendation by all four groups and a priority by one. In the case of aggressive student behavior, the same process was conducted, but by three groups as opposed to four. The entire list of the 102 consolidated mitigations can be found in the appendix.

The following sections of this report discuss the SSTF's priority recommendations to the Board of School Directors.

Section 2: Recommendations

Elementary Student Abduction

Abduction of an elementary child by a non-custodial parent or stranger was a concern for the public, as well as for the members of the SSTF. The Task Force examined vulnerabilities regarding this threat from inside and outside of the physical plant of the elementary buildings. Access to students is a reoccurring theme in the priority recommendations of the SSTF as illustrated by mitigations two, four, and five below. Although these mitigations could be combined under the heading of "Improving safeguards for access to elementary students," the mitigations are provided separately, so that implementation of one mitigation is not hindered or slowed by the implementation of other mitigations that may require additional research or examination. The Task Force felt the likelihood of a non-custodial parent kidnapping an elementary child was low, while the likelihood of a stranger kidnapping an elementary child was very low. The impact of the threat in both scenarios was seen as high. Generally, the vulnerabilities of these threats focused on ease of entrance to buildings and ease of access to students while they are outside for activities such as recess. The impact of the mitigations ranged from positive to negative. The positive effects of the mitigation included school climate and trust; while the negative effects included staff and instructional time loss. The impact of the mitigations on personal consequences was positive or neutral with one exception, "Engaging visitors in dialogue prior to gaining access." The impact of "Engaging visitors in dialogue prior to gaining access" was seen as negative, for visitors will be required to give greater explanation of why they are visiting the building via the entrance intercommunications system. There is concern that visitors will queue up outside of the door while speaking with personnel in the building main office regarding their reason for visiting the building.

The recommended mitigations below for elementary student abduction are not in priority order. All mitigations listed below were seen as a priority by the SSTF and should be considered equally. The number following the mitigation corresponds to the Risk Assessment details in Appendix B:

1. Installing fencing or additional fencing around recess areas (3, 15);
2. Engaging visitors in dialogue prior to gaining access (25);
3. Improving facilities for better security (26);
4. Teaching children and adults not to open doors for persons trying to enter a building (29);
5. Improving visitor ID badge procedures (30);
6. Increasing and improving building entrance cameras (35, 44).

MITIGATION DETAILS:

1. *Installing fencing or additional fencing around recess areas:*

Additional fencing around recess areas will vary by building. In addition to cost, the Task Force emphasized the need to develop a plan for communicating this mitigation to parents, guardians, community members and local law enforcement. Signage clearly communicating information regarding access was recommended, as well as the need to ensure easy egress from recess areas. Additionally, regular inspection of fences was suggested to ensure safety of children and adults.

2. *Engaging visitors in dialogue prior to gaining access:*

Engaging visitors is done now; however, the degree of engagement and procedures for the conduct of the engagement varies throughout the District. It was recommended by the Task Force that a consistent protocol be established district-wide for the engagement of visitors via intercom system before permitting entrance to the building. The establishment of a visitor engagement protocol will require staff training on the appropriate methods to engage visitors, ensuring visitors feel welcome and safe, as well as training on how to deny access to the building or to determine if an escort into the building is necessary. The protocol should include keeping records of the number of visitors to the building, so ongoing assessments can be made to determine if additional staffing is required. The implementation of a visitor engagement protocol could result in visitors queuing up outside of the building, which will require the District to communicate to and educate parents and other visitors about the District's efforts to improve safety and security.

3. *Improving facilities for better security:*

Improving facilities is presently underway with projects starting this summer at Bala Cynwyd Middle School, followed by projects at Welsh Valley Middle School, and Cynwyd, Penn Valley, and Penn Wynne Elementary Schools. Although the scope of these projects varies, each project has a focus on creating an entrance requiring visitors to enter an administrative space before having access to the building. The Task Force members recommended engaging a consultant who is knowledgeable about physical plant security to review our facilities improvement plans and ensure that the final spaces provide added security. Additionally, consideration must be given to the timing of facilities improvement projects to ensure that the educational process is not disrupted.

4. *Teaching children and adults not to open doors for persons trying to enter a building:*

Our children and adults are very polite and will often go out of their way to open doors for persons approaching our buildings. Unfortunately, this quality creates security risks. Students and staff have been instructed not to open doors, but they often do for visiting parents and guardians. The Task Force members recommended ongoing training for students and staff, complemented with education and communication to parents, guardians and other regular visitors not to open doors for visitors. Additionally, a universal script and education plan needs to be developed, as well as signage, explaining our efforts to create a more secure environment.

5. *Improving visitor ID badge procedures:*

Presently visitors are asked to sign-in and are supplied with a visitor ID badge. The Task Force members recommended improving the process of supplying a visitor ID badge and permitting visitors into the buildings. In addition to asking visitors to sign-in, visitors will be asked to supply a photo ID badge in order to confirm their identity. Research will be conducted to identify an ID badge product that will allow office personnel to take a photograph of the visitor and print an ID badge with the visitor's photo and name. Similar to other mitigations, a communication plan will be developed to educate parents and guardians regarding our efforts to improve security

through an improved ID badge system and protocol. Training and a universal script outlining how office personnel will request photo ID's from visitors will be developed. Additionally, training will be provided regarding situations when visitors do not comply with the visitor security practices. Finally, improving visitor practices for special events such as Halloween parades will be examined.

6. *Increasing and improving building entrance cameras:*

Security cameras are used throughout the District, however, the number of cameras and the age of the cameras vary by building. Many of the cameras are built on aging technology and are not integrated into a larger security system. In addition to adding and replacing aging cameras, cameras and the monitors used by office personnel will be moved, if necessary, to locations that permit better visibility of visitors. For example, office personnel may be able to view visitors directly from their computer workstations, rather than from a monitor attached to an office wall which will give them better visibility of the visitor. In addition to improving the cameras and monitors, consideration will be given to installing an integrated system that will allow cameras to be viewed from a single location or multiple locations. Beyond replacing cameras that are aging and built on old technology, consideration will be given to installing cameras located at doors that are to remain closed during the instructional day. The cameras could be used to alarm personnel should a door be opened. Finally, the Task Force members recommended improved signage district-wide explaining our efforts to improve the safety of our children through the use of security cameras.

Active Shooter

Although the genesis of the SSTF was the Newtown shooting, the data collected during the first public meeting of the SSTF revealed that participants of the meeting, parents, guardians and community members, were more concerned with child abduction at the elementary level and aggressive student behavior at the middle school level than they were about an active shooter. This data changed at the high school level where concern about an active shooter increased to 30.40%; however, aggressive student behavior remained high at 48.20%. Please see figures 1-3 for more information.

The Task Force felt the likelihood of an active shooter entering a building and engaging in gun fire was very low. However, there is no escaping the impact of this threat would be very high. Generally, the major vulnerability of this threat is ease of entrance to the buildings; therefore, some of the mitigations recommended in the elementary student abduction section of this report can be used to help mitigate this threat as well, such as engaging visitors in dialogue, teaching adults and students not to open doors and improving ID badge procedures.

The impact of the mitigations ranged from positive to negative. The positive effects of the mitigation included school climate, trust and personal consequences, while the negative effects included staff and instructional time loss.

The recommended mitigations below for active shooter are not in priority order. All mitigations listed below were seen as a priority by the SSTF and should be considered equally. The number following the mitigation corresponds to the Risk Assessment details in Appendix B:

1. Increasing number and complexity of active shooter lockdown drills (58);
- 2.
3. Ensuring all doors have thumb-locks (61);
- 4.
5. Training staff to better react to and evaluate crises situations (80, 81, 82).

MITIGATION DETAILS:

1. *Increasing number and complexity of active shooter lockdown drills:*

Presently, the instructional buildings practice lockdown drills three times annually.

The SSTF recommends that the number and complexity of drills be increased,

Although unannounced drills were recommended, consideration must be given to students calling (with personally owned mobile devices) their parents, guardians and law enforcement during such a drill. Additional drills, more complex drills, and potentially unannounced drills will require additional and timely correspondence with parents and guardians to educate and prepare them for this mitigation. Further, precautions must be taken with students who would find it difficult to have the normal

routine of their day disrupted by an unannounced drill. It was recommended that the Lower Merion Police Department and emergency medical services be invited to the drills to observe and make recommendations for improving lockdown procedures and practices. Finally, it was recommended that the procedures used during lockdown drills be standardized across the District, so that employees moving from building to building will be comfortable with lockdown procedures in any District instructional building.

2.

3. *Ensuring all doors have thumb-locks:*

During a lockdown, teachers and other employees lock the doors to their classrooms, offices and other spaces they are occupying such as the doors to the library. The thumb-lock door lock allows a staff member to very quickly lock a classroom door from inside of the room without the need for a key. During a lockdown, the time lost to finding one's door key, and in some cases having to go outside of the classroom to lock the door, is critical. During a lockdown, staff members must be able to quickly lock their doors in order to move to additional critical steps in the lockdown procedure, such as moving students out of the line of sight of a door. At this time, classrooms that do not have the thumb-lock door locks are engaging the door lock, but preventing the door from closing completely by placing a small magnet in the metal door jamb. In the event of a lockdown, the staff member removes the small magnet and lets the door close completely, thus locking the door. Having the doors locked all of the time while held open by a small magnet does lead to some issues such as the door closing and locking because the magnet has fallen from the door jamb. It was recommended by the Task Force to convert all doors throughout the District's instructional buildings to thumb-lock door locks.

4.

5. *Training staff to better react to and evaluate crises situations:*

Presently, staff members are trained for two types of lockdown: intruder outside-of-building and intruder inside-of-building.

It is the recommendations of the SSTF to examine the current procedures for intruder inside-of-building situations.

Staff and students running from the building happened at both Columbine and most recently, Newtown. In both situations, the students ran into the adjoining neighborhood to find safety in the homes of local residents. This change in procedure will vary by grade level.

The training for this change in procedure must be thoughtfully developed and scaffolded to greater complexity. It is the recommendation of the Task Force to initially implement this procedure with the assistance of security professionals and assistive technologies. An example would be requesting Lower Merion Police Department to observe and make recommendations, and using radios to tell staff members the location of an intruder and what will be the best escape route. Although the implementation of this change in procedure will be specific to each building, the education of parents and guardians must be consistent throughout the District. Finally, this recommendation is new ground for many, so the implementation of this recommendation needs to be examined carefully before adoption.

Aggressive Student Behavior

Beyond the elementary level, the data collected during the first public meeting of the SSTF reflected concern regarding aggressive student behavior. No other threat ranked as high as aggressive student behavior in both the middle school and high school polls. Please see figures 1-3 for more information. Aggressive student behavior is often examined through the lens of student programs; hence, two of the Task Force meetings were dedicated to reviewing the District's current policies and programs related to student programs.

The Task Force felt the likelihood of aggressive student behavior was moderate, while the impact of the threat was seen as moderate and high. The vulnerabilities of this threat focused on the aggressive students' access to other students and employees. The impact of mitigations ranged from positive to negative. The positive effects of the mitigation included school climate, trust and personal consequences while the negative effects included staff and instructional time loss. Only the fourth mitigation was seen as having a positive impact in all five areas relating to impact of mitigation.

The recommended mitigations below for aggressive student behavior are not in priority order. All mitigations listed below were seen as a priority by the SSTF and should be considered equally. The number following the mitigation corresponds to the Risk Assessment details in Appendix B:

1. Monitoring bullying, cyber bullying, and safety concerns through physical and electronic anonymous reporting systems (91);
2. Teaching students to alert employees about possible aggressive student behavior (96);
3. Providing more mental health support and support groups for students (100);
4. Providing call forwarding and points of contact for situations concerning student behavior (102).

MITIGATION DETAILS:

1. *Monitoring bullying, cyber bullying, and safety concerns through physical and electronic anonymous reporting systems :*

All District schools currently monitor and report bullying, including cyber bullying, as required by School Board policy and state law. However, the Task Force recommended that additional and innovative means of reporting bullying be established at each school. By way of "physical," the Task Force understood that staff and students currently have the option of providing written reports in "drop boxes" at each school building. Task Force members expressed concerns that single or even several locations of such boxes are insufficient to encourage students or staff to report their concerns. Furthermore, Task Force members expressed concern that regardless of where the boxes are placed, students and staff might be reluctant to use them out of concern for anonymity.

Task Force members advised that both students and staff would be more likely to report concerns about student behaviors if they were able to do so electronically. This would allow reporting of behaviors at any time of the week and from any location where an appropriate

electronic device is available. One concern raised on several occasions throughout the process is that individuals might use such an anonymous process to falsely report behaviors or concerns regarding others. However, the Task Force came to a consensus that the risk of this happening is far outweighed by the benefits of receiving information in a timely manner and providing interventions expeditiously.

When discussing how an electronic, anonymous reporting system would be utilized, the concept of an "electronic drop-box" was discussed whereby individuals could anonymously report an issue of concern and trained staff members would regularly monitor the drop-box and respond appropriately. A rotating schedule of trained District staff responders was discussed as a possibility. One concern raised and discussed at length, and one which will need to be given great consideration in the development of such an electronic process, is how the drop-box will be monitored during "off school hours." The Task Force advised that both staff and students would need to be trained in the appropriate use of the system. This training needs to include assisting staff with prioritizing concerns that are registered, and teaching students about the serious consequences involved in false reporting. Students, staff, and parents will also need to be clearly advised that the drop box cannot always be monitored during off school hours and that concerns regarding imminent safety, health and well-being need to be reported to appropriate authorities immediately. Community crisis response resources should also be provided when providing information about the "drop-box" system and its appropriate use for staff and students.

The Task Force also recommended that the District conduct thorough research into best practices regarding such a reporting system. This will include contact with local school districts using a similar or comparative system to that which is currently being contemplated (e.g., Colonial School District).

2. *Teaching students to alert employees about possible aggressive student behavior:*

A kindergarten through twelfth grade guidance curriculum is available to all students attending District schools. Embedded in these programs are classroom lessons, assemblies and individual sessions to provide students with support and strategies regarding recognizing and reporting aggressive behaviors. Specifically, Second Step and Responsive Classroom programming are provided to all students at the elementary level. At the middle school level, The Olweus Program is provided to all students. The commonality of these programs is to foster a positive school climate through the building of student resiliency, communication/conflict resolution skills and positive peer relationships in students.

A concern raised by the Task Force was the District's commitment and ability to continue the structured guidance and bullying prevention programs currently delivered at the elementary and middle schools and also to adapt them to be developmentally appropriate at the high school level. Recognizing that scheduling is an issue at the high school, delivering some variation of these programs was discussed for implementation. Specifically, the Task Force recommended instituting classroom lessons with possible role play activities during Student

Advisories. These lessons would focus on recognizing the various forms of bullying, empowering the bystander, and promoting student resiliency. At this time, the high school student services teams are drafting classroom lessons based upon the resiliency framework. For instance, helping students develop skills such as recognizing personal strengths, setting clear boundaries and developing strong interpersonal and communication skills to promote a positive, anti-bullying school climate are lessons that should be considered. The Task Force recommends that the District commit to using Student Advisories on a consistent basis to specifically address issues regarding bullying and other forms of aggressive or otherwise unhealthy and unacceptable student behaviors.

In Fall 2011, the District implemented a training curriculum to assist all staff with understanding the many aspects of student bullying and "micro-aggressions," particularly as it impacts students of diverse socio-cultural identities and historically disenfranchised groups. Within this training, staff learned the specific types of micro-aggressions that exist and role played various ways to address the micro-aggressions. It is proposed that some variation of this training be used with students at the high schools, tailoring the presentation to the developmental level of the students. This training should allow for effective role playing opportunities and practice of newly taught skills.

3. *Providing more mental health support and support groups for students:*


Clinical and counseling staff are available at all buildings on a full-time basis to support mental health and promote well-being. Each building is staffed with school counselors and school psychologists. School social workers are available at the secondary schools on an ongoing basis, and at the elementary schools, on an as-needed basis to support students and their families. Additionally, the District employs a Wellness Counselor to assist all secondary schools with the START referral system and the monitoring of ongoing student needs. In April 2013, the District contracted additional mental health supports for both high schools through an outside agency. One benefit of utilizing a contracted agency for student mental health supports is that the START teams can refer directly to these counselors for support and interventions while at school rather than requiring students to use an outside agency (e.g., Lower Merion Counseling). The Task Force recommends that continuing or expanding these mental health supports/services for our students remain a District priority.

Building-based Achievement Teams are currently in place at all ten schools. Clinical staff members are active members of the achievement teams and assist all relevant personnel with understanding the signs of student distress and developing appropriate interventions. START referral teams are in place at the secondary level to allow for a systematic reporting regarding student behaviors. The Task Force recommends further action in this area, which could include routine dissemination of information about student stressors, warning signs and a review of school-based resources. The dissemination of this information could be provided at each building by clinical team staff at regularly scheduled faculty meetings. Furthermore, reminders to staff regarding the role of the START team should be provided on an ongoing basis

throughout the school year. An additional recommendation is to provide this information at the new teacher induction training program in August (NTAP).

4. *Providing call forwarding and points of contact for situations concerning student behavior:*

During the SSTF meetings, concerns were raised that in the event of an emergency, building administrators or their office staff members sometimes have difficulty immediately contacting a district office administrator. This reportedly occurs when incoming calls go to voicemail rather than being forwarded to a live employee who can take the message or forward to the intended recipient. The Task Force suggested that administrators at central office forward phone lines when out of the office to ensure a prompt response to concerns. An alternative or additional option would be to institute a procedure where all district personnel are directed to contact the district receptionist when the desired administrator cannot be located and the receptionist would ensure that the next available administrator be notified of the emergency. A similar concern was raised regarding school building personnel not always able to reach building administration or office staff in an emergency. It was recommended that school building staff be provided with a phone tree that includes central office administrators in the event a school building administrator cannot be contacted in an emergency situation.



Appendix A

Elementary Student Abduction

R--Recommended
 NR--Not Recommended
 P--Priority

		R	NR	P
25	Inside - non custodial parent - engage visitors in dialogue before opening door	4		4
26	Inside - non custodial parent - facilities improvement	4		2
35	Inside - non custodial parent - increase and improve building entrance cameras	4		2
3	Outside - non custodial parent - additional fencing/fencing for recess area	4		1
15	Outside -stranger or community member - additional fencing/fencing for recess area	4		1
29	Inside - non custodial parent - teach children and adults not to allow people into the building, "piggy backing" or propping doors open	4		1
30	Inside - non custodial parent - improve visitor ID badge procedures -requesting/keeping picture ID from visitor, requiring visitors to wear ID badges	4		1
44	Inside -stranger or community member - improve visitor ID badge procedures -requesting/keeping picture ID from visitor, requiring visitors to wear ID badges	4		1
27	Inside - non custodial parent - increase requests for custodial parent information	4		
38	Inside -stranger or community member - engage visitors in dialogue before opening door	4		
39	Inside -stranger or community member - facilities improvement	4		
41	Inside -stranger or community member - teach children and adults not to allow people into the building, "piggy backing" or propping doors open	4		
49	Inside -stranger or community member - increase and improve building entrance cameras	4		
4		3	1	1
37	Inside - non custodial parent - increase staff at building offices to assist with visitors	3	1	1
6		3	1	
16		3	1	
18		3	1	
28	Inside - non custodial parent - require all employees to wear ID badges	3	1	
40	Inside -stranger or community member - require all employees to wear ID badges	3	1	
51	Inside -stranger or community member - increase staff at building offices to assist with visitors	3	1	
10	Outside - non custodial parent - additional fencing/fencing for recreational area	2	2	1
22	Outside -stranger or community member - additional fencing/fencing for recreational area	2	2	1
42	Inside -stranger or community member - provide parents and guardians with ID badge	2	2	1
2		2	2	
5		2	2	
7	Outside - non custodial parent -increase ratio of parent/guardian chaperons to students	2	2	
12		2	2	
14		2	1	
19	Outside -stranger or community member - increase ratio of parent/guardian chaperons to students	2	2	
24		2	2	
31	Inside - non custodial parent - improve visitor ID badge procedures by purchasing background check ID solution	2	1	
36	Inside - non custodial parent - security stationed at building main entrances	2	2	
45	Inside -stranger or community member - improve visitor ID badge procedures by purchasing background check ID solution	2	2	
50	Inside -stranger or community member - security stationed at building main entrances	2	2	
9	Outside - non custodial parent - hire additional supervision at celebration or special activity	1	3	
17		1	2	
21		1	3	
23	Outside -stranger or community member - increase ratio of parent/guardian chaperons to students	1	3	
32	Inside - non custodial parent - improve visitor ID badge procedures by asking visitors a series of security questions specific to each child	1	3	
48		1	3	
1	Outside - non custodial parent - Indoor activities only at recess			4
8	Outside - non custodial parent - Indoor activities only at celebration or special activity			4
11	Outside - non custodial parent - increase ratio of parent/guardian chaperons to students			4
13	Outside -stranger or community member - Indoor activities only at recess			4
20	Outside -stranger or community member - Indoor activities only at celebration or special activity			4
33	Inside - non custodial parent - use finger print recognition software to confirm identification of parent/guardian			4
34				4
43				4
46	Inside -stranger or community member - improve visitor ID badge procedures by asking visitors a series of security questions specific to each child			4
47	Inside -stranger or community member - use finger print recognition software to confirm identification of parent/guardian			4
52	Inside -stranger or community member - decrease amount of community use of buildings			3

Appendix A

Active Shooter/Enraged Intruder

R--Recommended

NR--Not Recommended

P--Priority

	R	NR	P
58 Increase number and complexity of Active Shooter Lock Down Drills, such as unannounced drills	4		2
80 Train staff to better react to and evaluate crisis situations, when to evacuate elementary children from large rooms	4		2
59	4		1
61 Using magnets to secure doors faster that do not have thumb locks	4		1
71	4		1
81	4		1
82	4		1
53 Engage visitors in dialogue before opening door	4		
54 Decrease number of open doors by increasing number of doors with badge access systems	4		
55 Facilities Improvements	4		
60 Police officers visiting buildings	4		
62 Teach children and adults not to allow people into the building, "piggy backing" or propping doors open	4		
69	4		
74 Increase training for staff and students to quickly enter buildings to include methods of opening doors that are normally closed	4		
75	4		
76	4		
83 Enraged Intruder - Community member/stranger - Train building administration and designated personnel de-escalation techniques for an enraged person	3	1	1
84 Enraged Intruder -Student - Train building administration and designated personnel de-escalation techniques for an enraged person	3	1	1
85 Enraged Intruder -Family - Train building administration and designated personnel de-escalation techniques for an enraged person	3	1	1
70 Increase resources available to police department, such as easy access to buildings and access to building cameras	3	1	
79 Allow the monitoring of door cameras from a single location	3	1	
66 Patrol perimeter of building	2	2	
72	2	2	
77 Security stationed at building main entrances	2	2	
57 Protective laminate on ground floor windows	1	3	
65 Glass break alarms on all ground floor windows and doors	1	3	
56 Train personnel in behavioral analysis and pattern matching recognition		4	
63 Check visitors' bags		4	
64 Install metal detectors		4	
67 Armed guards in building		3	
68 Armed veterans and retired police		4	
73		4	
78 Gun safety training for students and families		4	

Appendix A


Aggressive Student Behavior

R--Recommended

NR--Not Recommended

P--Priority

		R	NR	P
91	Monitor bullying, Cyber bullying, and safety concerns through physical & electronic anonymous alert system	3		2
96	Teach students to alert employees about possible aggressive student behavior	3		2
100	More mental health support and support groups for students	3		2
102	Call forwarding and points of contact for situations concerning student behavior	3		2
87	Educate staff what to look for and identify warning signs	3		
88	Communication between District staff regarding student issues	3		
90	Additional bus driver training regarding aggressive student behavior	3		
94	Maintain consistent implementation of policy and procedures including consequences for aggressive student behavior	3		
89	Facilitate further communication between parents, employees and students	2	1	
92	Additional training regarding positive behavior support and prevention of self harming behaviors	2	1	
93	Community programming regarding assistance for children dealing with family or mental health issues	2	1	
95	Expand transition programming	2	1	
97	Institute student volunteer programs	2	1	
99	Institute mentor programs	2	1	
86	Learn your students	1	2	
98	Institute D.A.R.E. program			3
101	Consider zero tolerance for bullies			3



APPENDIX B

No.: 3

Instructional Level: Elementary

Threat: Kidnapping Outside **Threat Source:** Family

Threat Description: Non custodial parent takes child from outside of school.

Potential Secondary Threat: Potential kidnapping of sibling. Irate custodial parent.

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	High	High	High	4.50

Vulnerability: When students are outside of building for recess.

Likelihood: Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 9.00

Existing Controls: Supervision of students while outside

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Install additional fencing or fencing around recess area.

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Neutral	Neutral	High	.60

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes: Must be researched by location. Consider ornamental fencing; it is harder to climb and provides visibility. Cost of signage.

APPENDIX B

No.: 15

Instructional Level: Elementary

Threat: Kidnapping Outside **Threat Source:** Stranger or Community Member

Threat Description: Stranger or community member takes child from outside of school.

Potential Secondary Threat: Irate parent.

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	High	Very High	Very High	4.83

Vulnerability: When students are outside of building for recess.

Likelihood: Very Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 4.83

Existing Controls: Supervision of students while outside

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Install additional fencing or fencing around recess area.

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Neutral	Neutral	Very High	.60

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes: Must be researched by location. Consider ornamental fencing; it is harder to climb and provides visibility. Cost of signage.

APPENDIX B

No.: 25

Instructional Level: Elementary

Threat: Kidnapping Inside **Threat Source:** Family

Threat Description: Non custodial parent takes child from inside of school.

Potential Secondary Threat: Potential kidnapping of sibling. Irate custodial parent.

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	High	High	High	4.50

Vulnerability: Ease of entrance to building.

Likelihood: Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 9.00

Existing Controls: Intercom communication with visitors to building.

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Engaging visitors in dialogue before opening door.

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Neutral	Positive	Negative	Neutral	High	-.20

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes:

APPENDIX B

No.: 26

Instructional Level: Elementary

Threat: Kidnapping Inside Threat Source: Family

Threat Description: Non custodial parent takes child from inside of school.

Potential Secondary Threat: Potential kidnapping of sibling. Irate custodial parent.

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	High	High	High	4.50

Vulnerability: Ease of entrance to building.

Likelihood: Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 9.00

Existing Controls: Facilities improvements underway.

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Improving facilities for better security.

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Neutral	Neutral	High	.60

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes:

APPENDIX B

No.: 29

Instructional Level: Elementary

Threat: Kidnapping Inside **Threat Source:** Family

Threat Description: Non custodial parent takes child from inside of school.

Potential Secondary Threat: Potential kidnapping of sibling. Irate custodial parent.

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	High	High	High	4.50

Vulnerability: Ease of entrance to building.

Likelihood: Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 9.00

Existing Controls: Students and staff have been instructed not to open doors for anyone, on-going training continues at each school.

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Teach children and adults not to allow people into building, "piggy backing" or propping doors open.

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Negative	Negative	High	.00

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes:

APPENDIX B

No.: 30

Instructional Level: Elementary

Threat: Kidnapping Inside **Threat Source:** Family

Threat Description: Non custodial parent takes child from inside of school.

Potential Secondary Threat: Potential kidnapping of sibling. Irate custodial parent.

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	High	High	High	4.50

Vulnerability: Ease of entrance to building.

Likelihood: Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 9.00

Existing Controls: Visitors are currently required to sign into buildings and are supplied with a visitor badge.

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Improving visitor ID badge procedures by requesting picture ID from visitor, requiring visitors to wear ID badges during visit, challenging visitors without ID badges.

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Negative	Neutral	High	.40

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes: Consider a system that photographs the visitor and prints visitor photograph on ID Badge. Create procedure to check persons photo ID against their badge photo.

APPENDIX B

No.: 35

Instructional Level: Elementary

Threat: Kidnapping Inside **Threat Source:** Family

Threat Description: Non custodial parent takes child from inside of school.

Potential Secondary Threat: Potential kidnapping of sibling. Irate custodial parent.

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	High	High	High	4.50

Vulnerability: Ease of entrance to building.

Likelihood: Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 9.00

Existing Controls: Cameras are currently used at each building.

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Increasing and improving building entrance cameras.

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Neutral	Neutral	High	.60

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes:

APPENDIX B

No.: 44

Instructional Level: Elementary

Threat: Kidnapping Inside **Threat Source:** Stranger or Community Member

Threat Description: Individual enters building and takes child from inside of school.

Potential Secondary Threat: Irate custodial parent.

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	High	Very High	Very High	4.83

Vulnerability: Ease of entrance to building.

Likelihood: Very Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 4.83

Existing Controls: Visitors are currently required to sign into buildings are supplied with a visitor badge.

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Improving visitor ID badge procedures by requesting picture ID from visitor, requiring visitors to wear ID badges during visit, challenging visitors without ID badges.

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Very High	.40

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes:

APPENDIX B

No.: 58

Instructional Level: All

Threat: Active Shooter **Threat Source:** Anyone

Threat Description: Individual entering building and engaging in gunfire.

Potential Secondary Threat: Multiple

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	5.00

Vulnerability: Ease of entrance to building.

Likelihood: Very Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 5.00

Existing Controls: Currently three lock down drills are done each year, with the first one announced to the entire school.

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Increasing number and complexity of Active Shooter Lock Down Drills, such as unannounced drills.

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Neutral	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Very High	.00

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes: May require modifications to building exits.

APPENDIX B

No.: 59

Instructional Level: All

Threat: Active Shooter **Threat Source:** Anyone

Threat Description: Individual entering building and engaging in gunfire.

Potential Secondary Threat: Multiple

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	5.00

Vulnerability: Ease of entrance to building.

Likelihood: Very Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 5.00

Existing Controls:

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation:

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Very High	.40

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes:

APPENDIX B

No.: 61

Instructional Level: All

Threat: Active Shooter **Threat Source:** Anyone

Threat Description: Individual entering building and engaging in gunfire.

Potential Secondary Threat: Multiple

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	5.00

Vulnerability: Ease of entrance to building.

Likelihood: Very Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 5.00

Existing Controls: Doors need to be locked with a key from the hallway side in several of our schools; teachers need to keep keys readily available in case of emergency.

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Using magnets to secure doors faster that do not have thumb locks. Exploring cost of replacing key locks with thumb locks.

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Neutral	Neutral	Very High	.60

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes:

APPENDIX B

No.: 71

Instructional Level: All

Threat: Active Shooter **Threat Source:** Anyone

Threat Description: Individual entering building and engaging in gunfire.

Potential Secondary Threat: Multiple

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	5.00

Vulnerability: Ease of entrance to building.

Likelihood: Very Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 5.00

Existing Controls:

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation:

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Neutral	Neutral	Very High	.60

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes:

APPENDIX B

No.: 80

Instructional Level: Elementary

Threat: Active Shooter **Threat Source:** Anyone

Threat Description: Individual entering building and engaging in gunfire.

Potential Secondary Threat: Multiple

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	5.00

Vulnerability: Ease of entrance to building.

Likelihood: Very Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 5.00

Existing Controls:

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation:

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Neutral	Positive	Negative	Negative	Very High	-.20

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes: Training cost. May require modifications to building exits.

APPENDIX B

No.: 81

Instructional Level: Middle

Threat: Active Shooter **Threat Source:** Anyone

Threat Description: Individual entering building and engaging in gunfire.

Potential Secondary Threat: Multiple

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	5.00

Vulnerability: Ease of entrance to building.

Likelihood: Very Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 5.00

Existing Controls:

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation:

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Neutral	Positive	Negative	Negative	Very High	.00

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes: Training cost. May require modifications to building exits.

APPENDIX B

No.: 82

Instructional Level: High

Threat: Active Shooter **Threat Source:** Anyone

Threat Description: Individual entering building and engaging in gunfire.

Potential Secondary Threat: Multiple

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	5.00

Vulnerability: Ease of entrance to building.

Likelihood: Very Low

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 5.00

Existing Controls:

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation:

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Neutral	Positive	Negative	Negative	Very High	.00

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes: Training cost. May require modifications to building exits.

APPENDIX B

No.: 91

Instructional Level: All

Threat: Aggressive Student Behavior/Hate Crimes **Threat Source:** Student

Threat Description: Physical, verbal, or otherwise discriminatory student behavior directed at another student or District staff person.

Potential Secondary Threat: Multiple

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
High	Moderate	High	High	High	Moderate	3.67

Vulnerability: Access to other students and employees.

Likelihood: Moderate

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 11.00

Existing Controls: Current District policy regarding student rights and responsibilities prohibits hate speech, aggression and discriminatory behavior. School counselors and school psychologists are available at each building for students to report concerning behaviors

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Monitoring Bullying, Cyber Bullying, and Safety concerns through physical and electronic anonymous reporting system.

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Negative	Neutral	High	.40

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes:

APPENDIX B

No.: 96

Instructional Level: All

Threat: Aggressive Student Behavior/Hate Crimes **Threat Source:** Student

Threat Description: Physical, verbal, or otherwise discriminatory student behavior directed at another student or District staff person.

Potential Secondary Threat: Multiple

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
High	Moderate	High	High	High	Moderate	3.67

Vulnerability: Access to other students and employees.

Likelihood: Moderate

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 11.00

Existing Controls: Current District policy regarding student rights and responsibilities prohibits hate speech, aggression and discriminatory behavior. Responsive Classroom and Second Step Programs are available at the elementary levels. Olweus Bullying Prevention Program

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Teaching students to alert employees about possible aggressive student behavior.

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Negative	Negative	High	.20

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes:

APPENDIX B

No.: 100

Instructional Level: All

Threat: Aggressive Student Behavior/Hate Crimes **Threat Source:** Student

Threat Description: Physical, verbal, or otherwise discriminatory student behavior directed at another student or District staff person.

Potential Secondary Threat: Multiple

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
High	Moderate	High	High	High	Moderate	3.67

Vulnerability: Access to other students and employees.

Likelihood: Moderate

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 11.00

Existing Controls: Current District policy regarding student rights and responsibilities prohibits hate speech, aggression and discriminatory behavior. School counselors are available to meet with students at all schools; mental health counselors and clinical supports are

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Providing more mental health support and support groups for students

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Negative	Neutral	High	.40

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes:

APPENDIX B

No.: 102

Instructional Level: All

Threat: Aggressive Student Behavior/Hate Crimes **Threat Source:** Student

Threat Description: Physical, verbal, or otherwise discriminatory student behavior directed at another student or District staff person.

Potential Secondary Threat: Multiple

Impact of Threat:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Loss of Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Monetary Loss</u>	<u>Average Impact</u> Scale of 1 to 5
High	Moderate	High	High	High	Moderate	3.67

Vulnerability: Access to other students and employees.

Likelihood: Moderate

Threat Rank (scale of 1 to 25): 11.00

Existing Controls: Current District policy regarding student rights and responsibilities prohibits hate speech, aggression and discriminatory behavior. The District's Emergency Plan sets forth important telephone numbers and procedures for use in emergencies and crises.

Recommendation: Enhance

Mitigation: Providing call forwarding and points of contact for situations concerning student behavior.

Impact of Mitigation:

<u>School Climate</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Staff Time Loss</u>	<u>Instructional Time Loss</u>	<u>Personal Consequences</u>	<u>Summary Mitigation Impact</u> Scale of -2 to +2
Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	High	1.00

Mitigation Cost: TBD

Notes:



APPENDIX C

DEFINITIONS:

Security Policy—Policy, procedures and practices related to security of buildings, for example, the practice of locking doors after students arrive for the beginning of school.

Physical Security—Security created through the layout and construction of a building, for instance, an entrance that channels visitors into the main office of a building prior to having access to the larger building.

Student Programs—Policy, procedures and practices related to the welfare of students, such as the anti-bullying program Olweus.

RESOURCES:

1. Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence, 2nd Edition. Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice.
2. Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2011. U.S. Department of Education. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs.
3. Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, National Institute of Standards and Technology. U.S. Department of Commerce.

